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The notion that there can be no ultimately objective point of view by 
which the truth of a thing can be determined with absolute certainty 
is not  congenial to the Western mind. It threatens to undermine the 
principle values of prediction and control on which the advance of 
technology continues to rest. Precisely what characterizes contem- 
porary critical theory, however, particularly if schooled by Nietzsche's 
philosophical hammer, is the realization that theory, especially of  a 
dogmatic kind, can easily become the child of ideology. We are wit- 
nessing an ever increasing concern about establishing a more explicit 
philosophical foundation for critical activity and are consequently 
becoming unusually open to the influences of European thought, 
particularly from hermeneutic and deconstructionist camps. We are 
gradually waking up to the unconscious presuppositions of our cri- 
tical commonplaces and are discovering, as the Europeans have been 
discovering since the dissemination of  Nietzsche's major writings, 
that we are caught on the dual horns of the Cartesian and Neo-Kantian 
dilemma. Typical of the new sound on the American critical scene is 
the following attack by Paul Bov6 on the "Gnosticism" of Harold 
Bloom: 
The dualistic language of inner and outer worlds, of higher and 
lower, and of world and spirit compels Bloom to this movement 
out of time. For Kierkegaard, of course, Spirit and World are 
absurdly combined by virtue of the paradox of the Incarnation. 
For the post-Cartesian and, we might say, pre-existential Bloom, 
the inherence of the " two"  worlds is an impossibility forbidden 
by his rhetoric and his own aspiration to sublimity. In The Anxie- 
ty of  Influence, he insists upon the necessity of dualism to the 
critic and poet (AI, 33, 34, 38 -39 ,  40, 71-72) .  Dualism is not  
only the "source" of  poetic anxiety, but it is a fiction necessary 
to Bloom's claims that all poets and critics of strength must be 
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Gnostics (AI, 84-85 ,  130). The rhetoric of  dualism and of origins 
compels the conclusion that poets quest for a way out of time and 
the world and not merely for some imaginative space not filled by 
their predecessors. The movement out of the world and time can 
only be justified if the "world," the "other"  is Gnostically de- 
valued and thus seen as inhibiting the creation of poetry itself. 1 
When we turn to the more critically developed forms of  this attack 
in European thought we discover that the Cartesian dualism, especially 
in the form of Kant's epistemology, is a point of common issue in 
thinkers who otherwise diverge considerably in their critical views. 
Typical of these is, for example, that of  Theodor Adorno who, in his 
co-authored Dialektik der Aufkldrung, suggests that there is a direct 
correspondence between the so-called Copernican Revolution in Kant's 
epistemology and the tr iumph of ideology in postKant ian bourgeois 
culture. In demonstrating that all scientifically certain knowledge is 
based on the organization of a priori structures of the human mind 
which constitute the ultimate condition for the possibility of all experi- 
ence, Kant constructed a paradigm which corresponds to the controlled 
culture of the late capitalist period. In the culture industry, for exam- 
pie, all information is processed by the media according to exclusive a 
priori categories approved by the system which determines the form 
all experience must take. The audience is no more free to experience 
unprocessed reality than Kant's transcendental subject is free to expe- 
rience the thing-in-itself. ~ 
In Europe such voices could be multiplied almost endlessly, with the 
implication that the dualism of Descartes and Kant is one of the clear- 
est expressions of the will to power in the Western development, that 
the pursuit of science and technology did not spring wholly from an 
altruistic search for impartial truth, but rather from a too often un- 
acknowledged desire to master nature and turn its energy into a stand- 
ing-reserve 3 in pursuit of an ever more hedonistically conceived notion 
of human happiness. The frightening duplicity of this goal was already 
foreseen at the beginning of  the 19th century in Goethe's portrayal of 
Faust's industrial, technological ambitions. Faust dreams of creating a 
new land inhabited by free people, but the realization of the dream is 
subject to unconscious motives repressed and projected into his willing 
servant Mephisto who, unencumbered by any "prejudices" or tradi- 
tions, kills Philemon and Baucis in cold blood in the interest of total 
possession and control. The 20th century has brought with it an ever 
increasing fear of such duplicity when man, totally isolated from 
nature, can no longer see the world in the simplicity of its immediacy 
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outside the forms imposed by ideological manipulation. And so, con- 
temporary critical theory, in grounding itself philosophically, steps 
beyond the more limited areas of traditional poetics and literary 
history and confronts those questions of life and death which tradi- 
tional philosophy, in its excessive zeal for methodological certainty, 
relegated to the care of humanists and poets, that is, to those who re- 
calcitrantly refused to submit all experience to mathematical system. 
It is in the context of this developing struggle that we begin to 
understand that the shift in critical perspective involves a prior and 
more fundamental shift in ontological orientation. It therefore comes 
as no surprise to find that one of the more persistent critical issues 
during the course of this century has been that of the relation between 
art and truth, between aesthetics and epistemology. If indeed it is cor- 
rect that truth attains its only clear and compelling presentation in the 
logical proposition or the mathematical formula, then art, along with 
religion, must be relegated to that no-man's-land of cultural expression 
often referred to as "mysticism," with the obvious implication that in 
the serious business of life, namely the mastery of nature, such private 
concerns are negligible. So overpowering did this notion become that 
many who dared defend art as a form of genuine knowledge did so in 
terms of the only discourse available and acceptable, that of the Car- 
tesian dualism. They ended up in the wretched position of defending 
art as philosophical and moral statement, the triumph of the para- 
phrase. 
This conflict has brought about in our time the formation of a dis- 
cernible, but often shifting line of battle: on the one side the formalists 
with their general insistence on a scientific, objective, and structuralist 
approach to the text, whether literary or philosophical; on the other, 
a loosely connected group of thinkers generally associated with the 
development of phenomenology and largely acknowledging Nietzsche 
and Heidegger as the source of inspiration. Typical of this second group 
is the more or less violent reaction to the dualistic tendencies of Des- 
cartes and Kant, indeed to the whole Platonic tradition. It is among 
these that the demand for new solutions, not only to literary problems, 
but to the more pressing questions of modern life, led to the search for 
a new ontological orientation. 
It is particularly in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer that this con- 
fluence of art and philosophy - philosophy as shaped in the develop- 
ment of phenomenology from Husserl to Heidegger - received a prob- 
lematic but compelling voice. Over this endeavor one could place as 
motto Gadamer's commentary on Dilthey's assessment of the position 
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of Wilhelm Scherer in the development of nineteenth-century literary 
history and criticism: 
In his obituary for Wilhelm Scherer, Dilthey emphasizes that the 
spirit of the natural sciences guided Scherer's procedure, and he 
attempts to give the reason why Scherer let himself be so influen- 
ced by English empiricism: 'He was a modem man, and the world 
of our forebears was no longer the home of his spirit and his heart, 
but his historical object.' Hence Dilthey sees scientific knowledge 
as involving the dissolution of the connection with life, the estab- 
lishing a distance from its own history to become an object. 4 
It is precisely this divorce between thought and life, between thought 
and being, which leads Gadamer to his criticism of aesthetic conscious- 
ness, the point of departure for his Wahrheit und Methode of 1960. 
Gadamer shows in detail how Kant, in his at tempt to ground the uni- 
versality of man's response to beauty, must eliminate all cognitive ele- 
ments from the aesthetic experience. Both the product  of  art and its 
interpretation are rooted in the creative act of genius which has its 
origin in that sphere of life which is inacessible to natural cognition. 
In so doing Kant uprooted the human sciences from the fertile soil of 
their own self-understanding. 
It was the end of a tradition, but also the beginning of a new de- 
velopment. It limited the idea of taste to an area in which, as a 
special principle of judgment,  it could claim independent validity 
- and by so doing, limited the concept of knowledge to the theo- 
retical and practical use of reason. His transcendental purpose was 
fulfilled by the limited phenomenon of judgment of  the beautiful 
(and sublime) and removed the more general experimental con- 
cept of taste and the activity of aesthetic judgment  in the area of 
law and morality from the centre of philosophy, s 
The most important issue of Kant's subjectivization was for Gadamer 
the development and eventual impasse of  historicism, to which he de- 
votes a long section of  part two of Wahrheit und Methode. According 
to Gadamer, the historicists failed because they were unable to break 
out of the epistemological dilemma of Neo-Kantianism. They insisted 
on objectifying the past, and believed its meaning could, by using the 
method of  scientific research, be restored in its original form without 
any reference to the actual moment  of the interpretative event. In this 
case the truth of the past would be simply the correspondence of what 
actually happened with its ideal reconstruction in my own mind. In 
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this extreme instance the historicist is simply locked into an antequar- 
ian stance which, with its value free approach, allows no claim of  the 
past on the being of the researcher. As a historian I am obliged to take 
up a position outside the living context of both the historical moment  
and the present moment  of my own life. If I take up such a position, 
I effectively exile myself from all concretion of  the real and as a scholar 
am condemned to live in a world of pure objects which have lost their 
connection with the life process. 
For Gadamer, the breakthrough comes with Heidegger's realization 
that Being itself is time and that consequently transcendental subjectivi- 
ty had to be abandoned altogether. On the basis of Husserl's analysis 
of  the life-world Heidegger was able to ground philosophical reflection 
in a pre-objective realm of irreducible temporality. Understanding is 
thus "the original form of  the realisation of There-being, which is being- 
in-the world. Before any differentiation of  understanding into the dif- 
ferent directions of pragmatic or theoretical interest, understanding 
is There-being's mode of being, in that it is potentiality-for-being and 
"possibility". ''~ This conception of  understanding, on which Gadamer's 
critical theory is admittedly based, has its roots, then, in Heidegger's 
own ontological re-orientation. This re-orientation, in turn, is linked to 
certain controversial aspects of the German tradition, one of  which is 
certainly Nietzsche's attack on the notion of "objective" truth. 
The association of  Nietzsche and Heidegger with this movement  has 
brought with it considerable complication. The tendency to identify 
these two thinkers, as well as the entire neo-romantic movement  at the 
beginning of the century, with the destructive political development of 
fascism seems to support the formalist assertion that existentialism and/ 
or phenomenology contributed to the spread of  irrationality and intel- 
lectual obscurantism during this period. In Heidegger's case the be- 
wildering intricacies of inaccessible imagery has given rise to the rather 
facile and certainly misleading conclusion that the philosopher is quite 
simply "esoteric;" another word for Wittgenstein's "mystical," and 
with the similar implication that his later thinking wound up on an ir- 
relevant side-track. 
The word "esoteric," as used by the formalists, is meant, of course, 
to convey an attitude of irrelevance and indifference. But seriously, 
the word is often used to denote a somewhat muddy stream of un- 
orthodox religious and quasi-philosophical teachings under the various 
names of  Gnostic, Kabbalistic, Hermetic, etc., associated in the popular 
imagination with the symbologies of the occult: astrology, tarot, al 
chemy. Such esoteric groups have generally existed on the fringes of  
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the Western social and intellectual worlds, with the important  excep- 
tion of  the Renaissance, particularly in Germany where many of  the 
leading minds found in such ideas a conceptual vehicle viable enough 
to challenge the sterile abstractions of  a decaying scholasticism. For  the 
German tradition from Romanticism to the present the most  significant 
fruit Of that period is the Naturphilosophie of  Jacob Boehme who was 
an older contemporary of  Descartes and whose so-called esoteric writings 
have been influential in all German revolts against the Cartesian tradi- 
tion. Boehme's work actually has little in common with the typical 
figures of  the occult tradition. He made use of  the occult symbols, 
avidly studied in his hometown of  G6rlitz at that time, to try to for- 
mulate a new ontology which I am here calling, for want of  a more 
adequate term, an ontology of  non-duality.* 
Heidegger's occasional references to Boehme in the published work 
and his pointed use of  a couplet  of  Johannes Scheffler, a 17th century 
poet  and disciple of  Boehme, in the major treatise, Der Satz yore Grund 
(1957) are already sufficiently known to presume Heidegger's knowl- 
edge of  Boehme's work. But more important  for our present interest 
is the less widely known commentary  of  Heidegger on one of  Schel- 
ling's last published works, Of Human Freedom (Philosophische Unter- 
suchungen fiber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit) of  1809. Al- 
though published in 1971, this commentary on Schelling goes back to a 
series of  seminar lectures presented by Heidegger in the summer semes- 
ter of  1936 at the University of  Freiburg. 
It is to the affinity among these three thinkers that I would now 
like to turn, not  as an end in itself, bu t  in order to allow the contours 
of  a developing ontology to emerge, with which we can then return to 
our discussion of  Gadamer's conception of  Fusion. In order that we 
might keep this orientation in mind, I would like to quote  two texts 
of  Heidegger's which are typical o f  his writing on art and poet ry  and 
which also have the reputation of  being esoterically difficult. 
Truth establishes itself in the work. Truth is present only as the 
conflict between lighting and concealing in the opposition of  
world and earth...The conflict is not  a rift (Riss) as a mere cleft 
* It is with some reluctance that I use a term familiar primarily to students of 
Buddhist thought and, if at all, is at present visible only on the far horizon of 
critical theory. I have chosen to retain it in the present instance because first, 
we really have no functional substitute and second, there is a growing realiza- 
tion that the thought of both Boehme and Heidegger is going to be of major 
importance in the continuing dialogue between East and West. 
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is ripped open; rather, it is the intimacy with which opponents 
belong to each other. This rift carries the opponents into the 
source of their unity by virtue of their common ground. It is a 
basic design, an outline sketch, that draws the basic features of the 
rise of the lighting of beings. This rift does not let the opponents 
break apart; it brings the opposition of measure and boundary 
into their common outline. 7 
The speaking of the first two stanzas speaks by bidding things 
to come to world, and world to things. The two modes of bidding 
are different but not separated. But neither are they merely cou- 
pled together. For world and things do not subsists alongside one 
another. They penetrate each other. Thus the two traverse a mid- 
dle. In it, they are at one. Thus at one they are intimate. The 
middle of the two is intimacy - in Latin, inter. The corresponding 
German word is unter, the English inter. The intimacy of word 
and thing is not a fusion. Intimacy obtains only where the inti- 
mate - world and thing - divides itself cleanly and remains sepa- 
rated. In the midst of the two, in the between of world and thing, 
in their inter, division prevails: a difference. 8 
The first passage comes from The Origin of  the Work of  Art (Der Ur- 
sprung des Kunstwerkes), the published version of which is based on a 
lecture which Heidegger first gave in 1935. The second passage comes 
from Language (Die Spraehe) which Heidegger gave twice as a lecture in 
the years 1950 and 1951 and is primarily devoted to a discussion of 
Trakl's poem "Winterabend." I have quoted both of these works, not 
out of a penchant for redundancy, but rather to demonstrate clearly 
how central and persistent are the language and imagery used by Heid- 
egger from the 1930's to the 1960's. In this context we must also not 
forget that Heidegger gave his first H61derlin interpretations in 1935 
and that the seminar on Schelling, as mentioned before, was held in 
1936. 
The language Heidegger uses here is not what we would call philoso- 
phical in the traditional sense. The imagery of rift and design, the oppo- 
sition of fight and clark are more typical of poetic imagery. (He does 
indeed avoid the reduction of philosophical language down to the ef- 
ficiency of contemporary analysis.) In driving philosophical reflection 
back to the realm of pre-objective experience, Heidegger discovered, 
for example, the highly metaphorical language of Heraclitus. In a 
seminar on this pre-Socratic thinker given by Heidegger and Fink in the 
winter semester 1966167, there is a great deal of meditation on the 
imagery of the lightning flash in the darkness of the night sky. 9 Heideg- 
get discovered a similar unity of thought and poetry in the works of 
Jacob Boehme whose ontology is expressed almost entirely in the 
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language of  the Kabbalah. That is what we now want to look at more 
closely. 
We can best venture into the region of  the problem by briefly sum- 
marizing the principal elements of Boehme's ontology. The difficulty 
lies primarily in translating the metaphors into some commonly accept- 
able terminology, and students of  critical theory have been helped in 
this by such works as that of Gerhard Scholem, 1~ the close friend of  
Walter Benjamin, and Harold Bloom, whose Kabbalah and Criticism 
introduces the esoteric material in the context of his own critical 
theory. 11 Boehme's thought is most easily approached from a structural 
point  of view. He himself refers to its most general pattern as "the 
Trinity on the cross" (Die Drey-Zahl aufdem Kreutz), since the dialec- 
tic of the numbers two, three, four, and seven plays a major role in 
the symbolism. Let us momentarily follow the unfolding of  this dia- 
lectic. 
At a certain moment  in the timelessness of unmanifest eternity, 
Being yearns to manifest itself, a yearning which is ultimately based on 
m 
the motion of love and yet involves a moment  of  anguish and darkness. 
The initial moment  of manifestation, the first movement of the free, 
divine spirit, Boehme calls the ungrounded will. Now no manifesta- 
tion can occur until this ungrounded will is grounded; and it can be 
grounded only by positing that which is not itself. But since there 
exists nothing outside the divine spirit, it must clear a space within 
itself, which is in itself but  is not  itself. This space is what Boehme calls 
nature, the dark world of  the divine ground, similar to an unreflecting 
mirror into whose darkness the spirit sacrifices its freedom in its an- 
guished yearning to reveal itself. 
Thus, the first will (which is called Father, and is itself freedom) 
desires Nature, and Nature with great longing desires freedom, 
that it may be released from the torment of  anguish ... The terror 
of its Nature is a kindler of fare. For when the dark anguish, as 
the very fervent, stern being, receives freedom in itself, it is trans- 
formed in the terror, in freedom, into a flash, and the flash em- 
braces freedom or gentleness, as 
Thus the absolute indifference of  pre-manifest Being gives birth out of 
itself to two contrary motions: first, the freedom of the creating light; 
second, the negation of  Being in the form of fear and darkness. These 
two manifestations are co-equal and, in the analogical terms of tem- 
poral succession, absolutely co-eternal. 
But Boehme is, of course, no Manichaean dualist. The presupposition 
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of  unmanifest reality itself Boehme calls the Ungrund, or equally 
often, Nothingness (Nichts). It is a dimension of reality of  which ab- 
solutely nothing can be predicated, neither that it is, nor that it is 
not. It is, in its absolute indifference, both the plenitude of reality and 
the emptiness of  nothingness. Those who are familiar with the symbols 
of the Kabbalah will easily recognize a variation of the En Soph. 13 
The importance of this conception for us is that it grounds the dia- 
lectic of  identity and difference which underlies Boehme's entire 
system. 
This dialectical process, carried out by the traditional seven spirits 
of nature, is one of open conflict. The desire to manifest demands the 
creation of real darkness without which the fight of manifestation 
cannot be seen. But the severe contraction, by which the dark world 
is formed in the free spirit, arouses in it the raging desire to escape this 
prisonhouse of darkness. Of course there is no escape. The paradox is 
unresolvable. The light which desires to be manifest must desire equally 
strongly both the creation and the endurance of the darkness which 
makes manifestation possible. Thus the life process consists in con- 
tinually overcoming a darkness which can never be completely over- 
come. 
The danger inherent in all of Boehme's attempts to describe this 
dialectic is the strong temptat ion to reify these two worlds, to assume, 
somewhat in the Cartesian fashion, that they are really and actually 
separate worlds, and that we must now find some way of  putting them 
back together again in order to resolve the conflict. But, of course, 
such is not  the case. The moment  in which the darkness is born out 
of  the fight is also the moment  in which the light is born out of the 
darkness. They are different, yet they are identical. This moment  is 
symbolized throughout  Boehme's works by the lightning flash. Its 
action both differentiates the fight from the dark by showing the 
absolute difference between them; and simultaneously unifies them 
by showing their primordial identity. This moment  of  the lightning 
flash represents in Boehme's system of  imagery the birth of  the seventh 
divine spirit of  nature which Boehme calls fire and is the center, the 
between, the middle through which and in which reality attains its in- 
effable concreteness. Neither language nor concept can capture it, and 
yet it is the presupposition of all language and concept. 
We know from Robert Brown 14 who, in his book on the later phi- 
losophy of  Schelling, summarizes the few facts available on Schelling's 
reception of Boehme, that Schelfing, along with Hegel, was introduced 
to the thought  of Boehme in the Schlegel circle in the year 1799, that 
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he was able to procure Boehme's work in 1804, and that Franz yon 
Baader, a colleague of Schelling's at Munich and an ardent disciple of 
Boehme, further influenced Schelling's thinking in these f'trst years of 
the new century. Anyone, however, who reads Schelling's Treatise on 
the Nature o f  Hurnan Freedom of 1809 needs no further proof  of how 
significant Boehme's impact was on Schelling's thought during these 
years, even though the word Kabbalah appears only once and Boehme's 
name not  at all. 
As is well known, the central concern of Schelling's Treatise is to 
demonstrate that human freedom, and consequently human evil, has 
its roots in the very act by which God created a free and finite being. 
Therefore evil must, somehow, be in God, since God comprehends all 
Being. But at the same time evil cannot be caused by God, since he is 
the source of  all love. The solution to the apparent contradiction be- 
comes possible for Schelling on the basis of  a new ontology, which is 
fully formulated for the first time in this work. For this purpose he, 
like Boehme before him, distinguishes two aspects of the divine life: 
ground (Grund) and existence (Existenz), corresponding precisely to 
Boehme's distinction between the dark world of  the divine ground and 
the light world of divine freedom. That there is no temporal succession 
involved in their simultaneous emanation is somewhat facetiously 
demonstrated by recalling the age-old question: which came first, the 
chicken or the egg? But this question points to one of the most serious 
implications of this developing ontology: the search for temporal origin 
is an illusory path, at most leading, if one is lucky, into the circle of 
dialectical mediation. To say that each polar element absolutely pre- 
supposes the other leads to the heart of  Schelling's ontology: 
In the circle, out of which everything comes to be, it is no contra- 
diction to say that that which gives birth to the One comes itself 
to birth through the One. Here there is no first and no last, be- 
cause everything is presupposed by everything else. No one thing 
is the other, yet its existence depends on the other. God has in 
himself an eternal ground of his existence which, insofar as he 
exists, precedes him; but likewise God is the presupposition of 
the ground, since the ground, as such, could not  exist if God did 
not  exist in actuality, is 
Of course, Schelling's ontology is still completely embedded in a phi- 
losophical theology, and, according to Brown, the development of  his 
later positive theology involved a severe modification, if not  outright 
rejection of Boehme's postulate of the Ungrund. The point is still dis- 
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puted in the Schelling literature and need not  concern us here. 
Of greater interest for our discussion is the fact that Heidegger, 
when choosing a work of Schelling for the seminar of 1936, chose the 
Treatise on Human Freedom, which represents the moment  of  Boehme's 
greatest impact on Schelling's developing ontology. And indeed Heideg- 
ger, somewhat inadvertently, gives the reasons for his choice within the 
commentary itself. At the center of the discussion on ontology he says: 
At this point the utter boldness of Schelling's thought comes into 
play. But it is n o  empty-headed game of a high-flying loner. It is 
simply the consummation of  an intellectual attitude which begins 
in Meister Eckhart and attains in Jacob Boehme a unique exposi- 
tion. But as soon as we recall this historical context the usual 
slogans begin to appear; there is talk of  "mystic" and "theoso- 
phy"...Schelling is no mystic in the sense usually meant in this 
case, a rattle-brain who likes to stagger around in the dark and 
amuse himself with mystifications) 6 
The high point of these lectures is the discussion of Schelling's onto- 
logy, revolving around the duality of ground and existence. He likens 
the ground to gravity with its characteristics of contraction and shrivel- 
ing, hence withdrawal and fleeing. Existence, as its name implies, desig- 
nates the opposite moment  in the dialectic of being, the expansive, the 
evolutionary. What is obscured steps out of the confines of  darkness 
into the light. For the light is always the illumination of  that which is 
concealed, dark, and irrationally entangled. But the real point  at 
issue here, as it was in Boehme and Schelling, is the precise determina- 
tion of the kind of relation which governs this duality. There is ob- 
viously a genuine separation, since the presupposition of all three 
thinkers is that real illumination demands real darkness, not an idealist 
abstraction. Concrete individuality is possible only if the state of per- 
fect unity is truly sacrificed in a moment  of anguish. But the very 
notion of perfect unity is, in turn, an abstraction which has no genuine 
actuality until it is grounded in darkness. Each of  the two principles, 
then, is actually realized only in and through the other. Both the reifi- 
cation of the difference as well as that of the unity brings with it a fate- 
ful distortion of the nature of reality. Heidegger sums up Schelling's 
exposition in the following passage of the lectures: 
When God first catches sight of himself in the hidden self-search- 
ing of yearning, there occurs the first existing. But this is not 
something that follows yearning in temporal succession. Rather 
it belongs to it co-eternally, as measured in the eternity of be- 
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coming. Just as the ground is ground only in respect to existence, 
so the act of stepping out  of itself toward itself is simply a step- 
ping out of the ground. But we must not say that existence re- 
jects the ground. On the contrary, as existing, the primal Being 
places itself precisely back into its ground. As existent, it has as- 
sumed the ground eternally, and thereby affirmed yearning as an 
eternal moment.  Thus it is and remains a continual self-consuming 
that never consumes itself, but  rather flares up into an inextin- 
guishable flame, in order to maintain, in its own appropriate dark- 
ness, the light which has been kindled in it. 17 
The disclosure of Being in the darkness of finite articulation is not  to be 
conceived as the instrumenting of a pre-existing, but unmanifest idea. 
The idea which is articulated has no concrete reality before its articula- 
tion, just as the instrument of articulation has no appropriate formation 
before the inchoate idea submits itself to instrumentation. The onto- 
logical principle on which this conception is based received consum- 
mate expression, appropriately enough, in Heidegger's discussion of 
man's confrontation with the question of technology in The Turning 
(Die Kehre), first given as a lecture in 1949. One notes the near Boeh- 
mean language: 
To "flash" (blitzen) in terms both of its derivation and of what it 
designates, is " to glance" (blicken). In the flashing glance and as 
that glance, the essence, the coming to presence, of Being enters 
into its own emitting of light. Moving through the element of  its 
own shining, the flashing glance retrieves that which it catches 
sight of and brings it back into the brightness of its own looking. 
And yet, that glancing, in it giving of light, simultaneously keeps 
safe the concealed darkness of its origin as the unlighted. The in- 
turning (Einkehr) that is the lightning flash of the truth of  Being 
is the entering, flashing glance - ins igh t .  18 
With this background in view, we can now briefly return to those 
passages quoted earlier from Heidegger's essays on art and poetry. By 
now it is clear, I believe, that Heidegger's vocabulary is not nearly so 
idiosyncratic as some critics have suggested. Terms such as "flash," 
"center," and "rift" have a very specific meaning seen in the light of 
the appropriate context. And we also recognize that these are not es- 
says on aesthetics in any narrow sense. Nothing could be more de- 
ceiving than to call the concept of being here an "aesthetic ontology" 
as Frank Lentricchia, for example, has suggested. 19 Among the several 
ways in which truth can be primordially disclosed, art happens to be 
one of the most important ones, and this alone accounts for its central 
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position in Heidegger's later thinking. On the other hand, mathematics 
and natural science, at least in the post-Cartesian form of method,  are 
not  based on such a primordial disclosure. This should not  be construed 
as a prejudice against science, as has too often been the case. It is sim- 
ply a fact, springing quite logically from Heidegger's basic ontological 
position and in no way questions the value of  science in its own sphere 
of legitimacy. Heidegger insists, however, that the primordial manifesta- 
tion of  truth, wherever it occurs, must be the result of  the pre-objective 
conflict between Lichtung (clearing) and Verbergung (concealment). 
This non-dual relationship between light and dark is the decisive con- 
text for the comprehension of  any of the primordial modes of human 
activity, including, as Heidegger expressly tells us, art, religious sacri- 
fice, and the formation of human community.  
Art can be a place where truth primordially happens because the un- 
resolvable paradox, in the form of the conflict of  desire and flight, be- 
comes visible in t he  mediation of world and earth by the thing. The 
nothingness of undisclosed Being can be revealed in its fullness only by 
allowing the darkness of a particularized thing to be illumined and 
grounded as the particular thing it truly is. The totality of  Being with- 
draws into the darkness, denies its fullness in the emptiness of nothing- 
ness, only to emerge from the center of mediation back into the light 
of finite articulation. On the dark matter of Van Gogh's shoes falls the 
light of Being and illumines them in the particularity of their limita- 
tion; at the same time the illumined brilliance of  the shoes discloses 
the horizon of a world in its articulated totality, just as the dark wick 
of a candle, to use one of Boehme's favorite metaphors, bursts like a 
flash into flame which articulates the darkness of the surrounding 
dwelling. Every work of art is such a flashing glance of insight into 
that which truly is. 
During the gradual development of this ontological position, Heideg- 
ger clarified what was from the beginning the phenomenological enter- 
prise: the contemplation of beings without the imposition of any 
artificial, teleological constructs. But within this new context it is 
apparent that to let a thing appear as it is, is not only a cognitive, but 
a moral and aesthetic event as well. The word Gelassenheit with which 
Heidegger designates this attitude of non-attachment, allowing a thing 
to appear as that which it really is, has deep roots in the German mysti- 
cal tradition from Meister Eckhart on. By this act of freedom in which 
we refuse to dictate to a thing how it can appear in order to satisfy 
the whim of egocentric desire, the thing becomes free to reveal, from 
its own unique perspective, the totality of  the disclosed world. Even 
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man himself, who in this respect is a thing among things, breaks out 
of the distortions of inauthenticity, imposed by both vision and will, 
and realizes himself as a vehicle of authentic disclosure. In this moment  
of ecstasy, standing out into the openness of Being, the illumination of 
the mind coincides with the rapture of the will: 
Knowing that remains a willing, and willing that  remains a know- 
ing, is the existing human being's entrance into and compliance 
with the unconcealedness of Being. The resolutness intended in 
Being and  Time is not the deliberate action of a subject, but the 
opening up of human being, out of  its captivity in that which is, 
to the openness of Being. 2~ 
At the same time this standing out into the disclosure of Being is ac- 
companied by a radiant shining which we call beauty: 
The more simply and authentically the shoes are engrossed in 
their nature, the more plainly and purely the fountain is engrossed 
in its nature - the more directly and engagingly do all beings at- 
tain to a greater degree of being along with them. That is how self- 
concealing being is illuminated. Light of this kind joins its shining 
to and into the work. This shining, joined in the work, is the 
beautiful. Beauty  is one way in which truth occurs as uncon-  
cealedness. 21 
There is no authentic truth which is not  at the same time a moment  of 
joy and beauty. To separate them is to fall inevitably into inauthentic 
disclosure where the intellect is blinded, the will becomes barren, and 
the radiance of beauty flees back into the darkness of concealment. 
This ontology, on the basis of which Heidegger comes to see art as 
one of the primary occasions of the disclosure of  truth is also the basis 
for Gadamer's solution of the problems of aesthetic consciousness and 
historicism. Indeed it has been he who most faithfully extends to the 
realm of  philosophical hermeneutics the ontological position of Heideg- 
ger's later period. In the subjectivisation of experience, ultimately 
locked into the abstraction of the transcendental ego, corresponds 
an equally abstract objectification of experience congealing in the 
value-free attitude of scientific research. The analysis of the problem 
by Gadamer in Wahrheit  u n d  M e t h o d e  has been the subject of a good 
deal of controversy, largely, it seems to me, because there has been a 
general failure to see its connection with the ontological position on 
which it is based. In no sense can it be said that he is opposing her- 
meneutical experience to methodological knowledge. Nor is he saying 
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that reflective understanding and the consequent methodological 
alienation of the object has no place in the hermeneutic sciences. He 
is however clearly saying that reflective understanding must, in order 
to maintain its critical insight, be continuously fed by a pre-scientific, 
pre-philosophical experience in which past and present are authen- 
tically mediated. 22 This is precisely the import of Gadamer's con- 
ception of  the fusion of  horizons. The past became an abstraction when 
conceived as lying outside and independent of the interpreter's under- 
standing. This is likewise true for a present which, because of extreme 
alienation, is thought of as detached from all tradition. Genuine under- 
standing, on the other hand, can only grow out of a tension or conflict 
between my present horizon and that of the past event I am seeking to 
understand. The fusion of  these two horizons refers to that moment  
when the concern for my own being becomes the center in which the 
past and present are mediated in the act of understanding. The center 
in which this fusion takes place is the moment  of the flash of insight 
familiar to us now from Boehme and Heidegger. The insight which oc- 
curs here, however, is not  the product  of reflection. In fact reflection is 
impossible until the flash of insight has achieved differentiation in 
structure and brought forth the language in which it can be expressed, 
both of which occur within the limitations of the immediate historical 
situation. The Totality of Being is, in itself, ineffable, but can, of 
course, show itself in phenomenological disclosure. But since it is as 
such ineffable it can show itself only by indirection, can only show it- 
self by not showing itself. To use the language of  Boehme, the Ungrund 
can show itself only by positing what is not itself, the limited, finite 
thing and allow this finitude to reflect the totality of the ineffable 
Ungrund. The accusation of relativism here quite misses the point, as 
Gadamer has tried to explain. What shows itself in every historical 
manifestation is, of course, the thing-in-itself, even though this occurs 
only by indirection and from a limited perspective. Genuine relativism 
arises only if we assume with the Neo-Kantians that we and the phe- 
nomenon are in a box, outside of which lies the completely unknow- 
able noumenon,  all speculation on which would then be purely subjec- 
tive and therefore purely relative. 
Like Heidegger before him, Gadamer turns to the work of art in 
order to clarify this ontological process. It is particularly visible in the 
discussion of drama, where the moment  of trans-subjective play is 
transformed into structure, for which the presence of an audience is 
a distinctive feature. The play having, in the form of book or manu- 
script; handed down from the past, only diminished being, has its 
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full being only in the moment of representation where the historical 
horizon of the dramatic material is fused with the present horizon of 
the audience through the mediation of the actors. This mediation is 
total. At the moment of presentation the world of the play is herme- 
tically closed. "In so much as it is a structure, it has, so to speak, found 
its measure in itself, and measures itself by nothing outside it. ''23 
Only through this aesthetic containment is it possible for the play to 
present a world in which the inessential trivia, characteristic of every- 
day experience, has been eliminated in the interest of high-lighting the 
essence. But this certainly does not mean that there is no referential 
connection between the world on the stage and the world in which I 
am concerned about my own being. In discussing tragedy, for exam- 
ple, Gadamer says: 
Being overcome by distress and horror involves a painful division. 
There is a disjunction with what is happening, a refusal to accept, 
that rebels against the agonizing events. But it is precisely the 
effect of the tragic catastrophe that the disjunction with what 
exists is removed...We are freed not only from the spell in which 
the painful and horrifying nature of the tragic destiny had held us, 
but at the same time we are freed from everything that divides us 
from what is? 4 
The drama, as we inherit it from the past, is an ineffable totality. The 
being of which depends totally on representation. To understand the 
drama, I cannot abandon the present horizon of my own existence and 
seek to restore that moment of the past out of which the drama was 
born, as if the object of consciousness could be disclosed in itself in 
some privileged moment outside of time and outside all mediation. 
Within the circle of interpretive understanding there is no such moment 
of origin. In fact, from the point O f view of what we have called a non- 
dual ontology, the quest for temporal origin is both illusory and repre- 
hensible. On the one hand illusory, because it assumes that the dark- 
ness involved in the disclosure of being is only accidental and can be 
overcome by reason's movement out of time, as if we were capable of 
stepping out of our finite limitations. On the other hand reprehensible, 
because the desire to abolish the darkness is too often the unconscious 
expression of the dogmatic insistence on total possession and control. 
It is in the clarification of this dangerous blindness that Richard Palmer 
sees the vital necessity of this new critical awareness: 
421 
The  " t u r n "  in Heidegger 's  t hough t  suggests a pr inciple  and an issue 
o f  highest  impor t ance  for  a pos t -modern  in te rpre t ive  awareness;  
for  it a t tacks  the  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  man  as the  king and cen te r  o f  the  
world  o f  in te rpre ta t ions ,  the  inven tor  and user  o f  language, the  
ho lde r  o f  t r e m e n d o u s  technological  power .  2s 
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